The paper argues that secularism in Europe needs to be fundamentally reconsidered. Everywhere European secular states face a double threat: on one hand fundamentalist religion, on the other negative secularism. Firstly, the paper will explain what is negative secularism and why it is a problem rather than an asset. It will then elaborate a new conception of positive secularism that can be understood either as a political or as an ethical project. Either way, the point of positive secularism is to distance itself from religion in order to embrace diversity of all types, religious and non-religious. Political secularism, however, relies on an elusive hope of reaching overlapping consensus between religious and non-religious people. Ethical secularism aims instead to protect diversity by promoting the establishment of a marketplace of religions, which acknowledges a public role for religion while regulating it. The marketplace of religions promotes religious pluralism and helps to iron out the different treatments between religions. Ethical secularism aims to be a worldview of worldviews that creates the preconditions for all religious and non-religious people to live well together.
negative attitude towards minorities and a positive attitude towards traditional majorities.
European Courts have to be bolder: in order to address the damning problem of the double standard, the point is to move beyond the negative conception of secularism that they attack. In section 1, I will illustrate the ways in which the ECtHR is stuck with a negative conception of secularism. To go beyond it one needs to develop a new conception of secularism, which I call positive secularism. Section 2 will present two possible variants of positive secularism and it will illustrate how positive secularism could inform the practice of the ECtHR so as to nudge European states into being secular in a way that is compatible with religious pluralism.
Negative Secularism
Negative secularism is defined in opposition to religion. It carves out a domain for religion and one for secular politics. It was simple to understand what secularism and its point were when European states were culturally and religiously homogeneous.
Christian religion and secularism were the two sides of the same coin. Christianity was not contested as a metaphysical doctrine or as an ethical standpoint. This was Europe after the Treaties of Westphalia: religious homogeneity was engineered in order to avoid conflicts between Catholics and Protestants. Ejus regio, cujus religio (to each kingdom its own religion) was the formula behind the birth of European nation states. From this viewpoint, secularism was just a compromise between each state and its own religious majority. 8 Today's Europe has changed beyond recognition since 1648. Three centuries later, and after two world wars, the European system of nation states had to be re-considered. The UDHR, which inspired the ECHR, and the Treaty of Rome that lays the foundation of the EU, regard human rights as the necessary limitation of state sovereignty. European human rights protect diversity of worldviews over homogeneity and European Courts have to act accordingly. 9 Negative secularism was formulated in a historical context where the secular state had to free itself from one dominant religion: the French State had to distance itself from the interference of the Catholic Church and did so with the statute of 1905, which formulated the legal principle of laicite'. 10 Today, laicite' is interpreted as denying religion any place in the public sphere, and securing its liberty only in the private sphere. Such interpretation is an ideological distortion of the principle of legal laicite which simply requested the separation between church and state. In what follows I criticize the position of the ECtHR for embracing a negative idea of secularism that portrays it in turn as a private conviction (a), as an ideology (b) or as a biased stance against minority religions (c). These three mistakes are part of a negative project of secularism (d) that needs to be abandoned.
a. Secularism as private conviction
Secularism is not à la page in Strasbourg. In the Lautsi saga, the ECtHR had to decide whether Italy was violating the right of parents to have their children educated in a way that is compatible with their convictions. Mrs Lautsi complained in particular that the presence of the crucifix interfered with the secular education expected in a state school.
In the last resort, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR concluded that Italy has the freedom to decide whether to hang a crucifix in public school's classrooms without infringing the right of parents to have their children educated according to their own religious or philosophical convictions.
At the chamber level, the decision went in the opposite direction. Secularism featured prominently and determined the outcome of the case in favor of the applicants, the Lautsi family: the court decided that the state has an obligation of neutrality in light of its secular nature. As a consequence, the wall of the classroom had to be blank, since the presence of any symbol would breach the state commitment to neutrality on one hand, and the parents' right to educate their children according to their own religious or philosophical convictions. The Chamber presented secularism as Mrs Lautsi's philosophical conviction. The idea needs to be criticized as it portrays secularism as radically subjective: one of the many beliefs that can be held by people. This will turn out to be a major conceptual and strategic mistake. It is a conceptual mistake because it confuses the secular nature of the state with individual preferences of the parents.
Secularism as a conviction is at best a by-product of state secularism; it should not be boxed into the language of art. 2 protocol 1, which reads as follows: "No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and teaching, the state shall respect the rights of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions." The court links parental secular convictions to secularism, thereby creating a basic confusion that still lingers on: the idea is that secularism could be considered as one of the many possible individual convictions, rather than the most important political project that Europe has embraced since the end of the wars of religions. Secularism in European constitutional history is a political project according to which the state should be run independently from the dominant religion in a given society. To present it instead as a philosophical conviction of the parents leads people to believe that secularism is an optional way of leading the state's business. 11 There is not a single European state that is not secular to a greater or lesser extent. The converse of being a secular state would amount to being a theocratic state.
The Chamber's judgment makes a strategic mistake as well: by insisting that the wall of the classroom should respect parents' convictions, the court is preparing the scene for the perfect storm. Why would the secular convictions of some parents be preferable over the religious convictions of other parents? Put this way, it becomes impossible to defend state neutrality. The state has no ability to choose between two convictions neutrally. It is either one or the other. The problem here is that the state's default secular position as a guarantee of all convictions has been undermined by the move of the court that unwittingly put religious convictions and secular convictions on a par, as if the two were mutually exclusive and addressed the same set of beliefs.
Herein lies one of the great weaknesses of negative secularism: it tends to simplify reality into two polar opposite. By the same token, it equalizes them. Religious convictions and secular convictions have the same value in the eye of the court.
11 Even theocracies cannot do away with a minimum commitment to secularism.
The opponents of secularism raised their glasses. The Catholic Church, together with Russia, and other intervening states, banqueted on the corpse of secularism. The political battle begun and it aimed to assert the Christian roots of the European project. Lautsi's Chamber decision gave the opportunity to religious people to call for more representation of religion at the national and supranational level. The Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR tried to limit the damage but the faux pas had already been taken. To present secularism as an individual conviction empowered religious convictions to claim equal treatment before the law and in the court. The alleged neutrality of the secular state had been compromised in the quest of protecting the secular views of the Lautsi family.
Some of the concurring opinions -in particular Judge Bonello's-went a long way in delegitimizing secularism as the defining trait of European states and of Europe as a whole. In his colorful concurring opinion, Bonello claims that: "in Europe, secularism is optional, freedom of religion is not." 12 This is a highly controversial claim. As pointed out, the converse of secularism is theocracy. It is hard to find examples of theocratic societies where freedom of religion is upheld. We can try to be charitable with Bonello: he may be suggesting that secularism is a defining trait of constitutional democracies, but not of an international system of human rights. However, even that claim is highly controversial. There is a minimal sense in which an international system of human rights is necessarily secular in so far that it has to refrain from taking the viewpoint of any given religion so as to be capable to protect all religions equally.
So the question is not whether secularism is optional or not; the question is which secularism is best suited to an international system of human rights. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how freedom of religion could be protected in a non-secular political space. Let us imagine -this time it is not hard to do-a state that is run on religious precepts taken from one religion. In this case, the majority's religion does not need freedom, since it has power. Other religions in this non-secular framework will enjoy freedom only to the extent that the majority's religion is willing to give it to them as a concession that can always be withdrawn. France asks everyone not to take offense if religion is ridiculed. But then it takes offence if someone wears its own religious symbols while walking down the street. This is another double standard that needs to be unraveled and discussed. In neither of the case, offense seems to be sufficient to regulate the relevant behavior. Behind the benign face of neutrality, hides the dark face of double standard; Christian religion can be embraced by a secular state as a form of tradition. But when other religious traditions claim freedom of religion, they are silenced in the name of the requirement of living together. The irony (and the deep sadness) lies in the fact that Lautsi had allowed the display of the majority's religious symbol in a classroom, pointing out that secularism is just an individual conviction like any other. In SAS a minority's religious symbol in the public street is prohibited, on the grounds that it is incompatible with an ideological understanding of French secularism. The morale is that freedom of religion amounts to the protection of whatever the majority happens to believe, be it religious or secular ideology. It is high time to rethink secularism and freedom of religion in a way that truly promotes living together -minority and majority alike.
d. Secularism as a negative project
Secularism is associated with disenchantment: from a world full of religious meaning, we come to a world emptied of its spiritual and magical content. 20 Some feel nostalgia for a world that has disappeared and that will not come back. 21 Secularism is not so much to blame here, but it is regarded as the empty alternative that has come to the scene. It does not make up for the loss incurred. It does not propose anything. It lacks the vision or the teleology that was provided for by religion. How can we possibly subscribe to a negative project that does not offer any substantive value to guide the society, a view that requires taking a negative stance towards religion?
The first step in that quest is to separate the concept of secularism from the concept of religion. If the two are too tightly linked, then secularism can only be understood as the denial of religion. There are many problems with such a negative approach, but the most daunting lies in the fact that there is no definition of religion in the first place. Thus, it is also impossible to define secularism; if anything it will be identified with whatever opposes religious beliefs and practices. But what if some of those religious beliefs and practices are part and parcel of the constitution of a society? To oppose them, would amount to oppose the very identity of a society. Does secularism amount to the denial that some political societies define themselves in relation to religious beliefs or practices?
Needless to say, it would be detrimental for secularism to do so. In fact, it seems unavoidable to detach the concept of secularism from that of religion. In particular, it is impossible to take theology as a starting point for a definition of religion. More 20 C. Taylor, 'Disenchantment-Re-enchantment', in G. Levine, The Joy of Secularism, PUP (2012). 21 Taylor is amongst those who are nostalgic of a Christian past, regarded as a more meaningful past.
precisely any type of monotheistic religion that comes with a theological apparatus has to be put aside in order to make space for non-monotheistic concepts of religion.
Religion cannot be defined in relation to the presence of one God. all views should be heard in matters of the constitution of society as well as on its policies to obtain the desired goals. The fundamental rethinking of secularism requires from the state a neutral position that relies on overlapping consensus as far as the general fundamentals are concerned, but with no pre-conception as to how the fundamentals will be balanced one with another. The trinity of values will bring inevitable conflicts, and will result in a set of dilemmas, which our societies are bound to face. To cope with such dilemmas, the secular state cannot adopt one size fits all solution, but should be patiently engaged in the negotiation of a collective identity that can only be done trough the good faith attempt to always secure the three or four goals mentioned above.
We can single out from Taylor's account two competing understanding of secularism.
The former is historical secularism, a project shaped in the dark ages of church and state conflict. The latter is a positive, substantive, secularism that attempts to respond to the present age of diversity at the metaphysical and political level. Taylor believes that the context in which secularism has been formulated has changed beyond recognition, and it is now time to re-formulate the content of that concept in light of the profound changes of context.
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I agree with that distinction: political and ethical secularism agree so far. It is high time to rethink secularism, and even to rescue it from its own negative reputation. It is not about religion any longer. But the two secular accounts part company over the concept of conscience. Is it possible to be neutral, if we start our analysis of freedom of religion from a concept such as conscience? The idea of conscience has a clear western root, and more precisely it has an obvious Christian connotation, and its interpretation divides protestant and Catholic Christianity. 37 Can such a notion be the starting point of a neutral evaluation of freedom of religion? Instead of focusing on conscience as a source of moral knowledge and moral action as Taylor does, I focus instead on thought, and suggest that religious belief is an expression of diversity of thought. doctrine that defends the superiority of diversity over homogeneity; religious worldviews are but one expression of diversity and they can be protected as such but not more than that nor less. The idea is not to work towards an overlapping consensus, but to defend the necessary primacy of ethical secularism.
b. Ethical Secularism
Ethical Secularism takes secular dilemmas seriously. To suggest that it is possible to reach a compromise, as political secularism does, amounts to a denial of dilemmas, and to the silent entrenchment of the majority's views on the place of religion in the public sphere. The fact that we face secular dilemmas must be taken as a sign of vitality of the political society. The conflict between the majority and the minorities of a society should not be swept under the carpet. It must be acknowledged and dealt with in a way that promotes a genuine exchange.
Ethical secularism makes a non-neutral choice in favour of diversity and against homogeneity. Diversity works as an interpretive device of all other values: whenever a conflict between values is at stake, diversity works as a tiebreaker. Take for example the crucifix case: does its presence contribute to a more diverse environment or does it promote homogeneity? Diversity clearly militates against the presence of the crucifix. Diversity of worldviews is superior over homogeneity, which has been the European default position after the Treaty of Westphalia. After all, the very homogeneity that characterized Europe after the Peace Treaty of Westphalia was an explicitly value-laden political decision taken at the international level in order to put an end to religious wars. 41 It is time to replace homogeneity with diversity as a nonneutral choice. The compromise entrenched by the Treaty of Westphalia can be rejected: we reject the idea that we have to carve out religiously homogeneous nation states out of a broader European political space. To be sure, Westphalia engineered homogeneity to cope with religious conflicts. An evil was certainly removed, but with it, the Westphalian political arrangement also removed the richness of socio-cultural and religious diversity. Postwar Europe regained very quickly a robust degree of diversity, and that contributes to a richer and more interesting environment; it is also a non-artificial environment. To be sure, it also contributes to a challenging political situation and the task of the secular state is to deal with diversity in a way that preserves its contribution and limits its risk. Ethical secularism has a strong instrumental component and a thin epistemological commitment. 42 It is instrumental in the sense that it is the value with which European states can be nudged away from state homogeneity. It has a thin epistemological commitment in the sense that diversity does not stand for a fully-fledged substantive commitment. It simply challenges received ideas and works as a comprehensive worldview of worldviews, enabling rather than silencing them.
It is necessary to move towards an affirmation of the secular age, something that
Taylor is not prepared to do. Ethical secularism displays no nostalgia for our religious past: the secular age is presented as being superior over the prior religious age. As an illustration of the superiority we can take freedom of religion: religious freedom can only be realized in a secular framework where all religious and non-religious views can live and thrive one next to another. To do so, there must be at least a minimum core of unity that is common to all religious and non-religious people alike. Since religious ethical views cannot comprehend other views -because by definition one religious truth excludes other religious truths-we have to look for a secular view that promotes diversity. Religious freedom is not protected where one religion is the only one that dictates the rules of the game for everyone.
The secular age is affirmed at three different levels. At the political level, ethical secularism is affirmed as the limitation of the authority of the state in matters of religious and non-religious diversity. In this sense, ethical secularism makes ample room for freedom of religion. At the moral level, it is a vision of how to live together that promotes genuine respect of religious and non-religious diversity. At the metaphysical level, it holds that diversity amounts to free thought. Thought is free when it is able to question itself constantly, but it is not necessarily presuppositionless: it cannot be reduced to pure logic. Any thought starts from an assumption, and then goes on examining it under the light of reason. Unconstrained thought can both be religious or non-religious. Free thought is the ultimate and most basic element of ethical secularism; in turn, this profoundly changes the conception of religion we are working with.
Ethical secularism is ultimately severed from any conventional understanding of religion since it regards religion as one particular expression of free thought. Free thought is compatible with the idea of starting from a set of assumptions. The fact that religion begins with an assumption about faith, singles it out as a special form of thought that is different from other forms of thought that postulate natural reason as the sole guiding light. Religious and non-religious thought are equally protected and equally open to further inquiry. Of course, beliefs will be open to challenge and when they will not be able to withstand those challenges, they will not be able to form the basis of any policy decision. Ethical secularism is positive in that it is not defined against religion, but it is instead an affirmation of diversity of thought. Religion as a result is not central to the definition of ethical secularism. Religion is one of the worldviews protected by it. Ethical secularism promotes a genuine exchange about all basic values and practices in our societies. The exchange does not require shedding one's own assumptions, but it does ask every participant to bring those assumptions to the forefront and to be prepared to accept all the challenges that free thought can bring to various ethical views of religious and non-religious origin.
It is a mistake to think that diversity of thought calls for legal pluralism. It is also a mistake to think that value pluralism is associated in any meaningful way with legal pluralism. Diversity of thought can be best realized within a unitary political framework. Human beings set up political institutions to maintain a certain degree of stability despite human irrationality due to the natural primacy of emotional reactions.
Human beings come together and form political communities as a matter of necessity:
they know that to form bonds is much more likely to serve their interest in survival and it is also likely to accrue one's own control over the external world. Political institutions are thus created to protect those basic human interests and as long as they are capable of serving those interests, they protect their existence; if political institutions start behaving in a way that undermines those basic human interests, then they become exposed to failure and ultimately to extinction.
Political institutions can develop an instrument to deal with religious diversity: I call that instrument the marketplace of religions, which is a sub-system of the marketplace of ideas. 43 The link between the ethical and the instrumental is not straightforward, so a few clarifications are in order: firstly, the connection is not direct; human beings have no access to the full knowledge of their biases; they only have a very fragmentary knowledge of human nature and of its own causal laws. Secondly, the impossibility of knowledge of human nature points to the inherent limits of human rationality that can at best work under less-than-ideal conditions of limited knowledge. Thirdly, limited rationality means that human beings are reaching practical decision on the basis of emotional reactions to the natural world. This means that prescriptive human laws have to engage with psychological motivations and provide appropriate answers to them. Fourthly, the success of a rule-maker will be measured by its ability to grasp the overarching interest of the community, while at the same time motivating people to strive together in that direction.
From an epistemological perspective, secular political institutions can hardly be bound by the idea of an overlapping consensus amongst reasonable people. That is presupposing too much about our possibility to know where the consensus lies and our ability to maintain it despite inevitable conflicts of worldviews. If it is correct that the actual possibility of consensus on religious matters amongst reasonable people is out of reach, the commitment to neutrality put forward by political secularism becomes problematic; 44 neutrality assumes that the secular state is completely separate and detached from any religion. But that is obviously not the case, and the existence of the double standard highlighted before shows the extent to which that is not true. The existence of inbuilt double standard makes neutrality impracticable and secularism weak. Neutrality is impracticable because European states automatically give preference to their own traditions that are inevitably rooted in one form of Christianity. Secularism is weak because it depends on its relation with one dominant religion. Neutrality could only make sense if biases could be completely removed.
But this is unlikely to happen. And even if it could happen, until this has not materialized, it is necessary to suspend the talk of neutrality and start with the work on the removal of biases. The marketplace of religions removes biases by giving more space to all religions, while subordinating all religions to the paramount requirements of free thought.
The marketplace of religions has the following features: first of all, the state is not neutral towards religions. Historically, it treats some religions with great regards and distributes specific benefits and burdens; to improve on that record, the secular state The marketplace is the instrument through which the secular state can make sure that no religion curtails other freedoms or engages in discrimination.
To move from religious conflicts to peace and stability, one has to have a double account. On one hand, ethical secularism affirms the superiority of diversity over homogeneity. On the other, it offers an instrument -the marketplace of religions-that treat religions as part of the unofficial public sphere 45 and as partners of the state while at the same time subjecting them to constraints of freedom and equality that apply to all other public actors.
c. Cashing out Ethical Secularism
Ethical secularism does not ask states to show neutrality at the political level; instead it promotes one comprehensive view that prioritizes diversity over homogeneity. should not have accepted such a lame justification on the part of France. It should have challenged it and asked France to reconsider it.
Conclusion
Europe needs to rethink secularism. It is often assumed that Europe is already secular, but that needs to be reassessed. I tried to show that Europe is committed to negative secularism, which is the product of past struggles, but not in touch with the present.
Negative secularism thrives because of the existence of an enemy: fundamentalist religion. In this struggle, Europe has everything to lose. Negative secularism empowers the most aggressive religious minorities by putting them in the position of martyrs. Repression of religion provokes a strong backlash, and alienates moderate religious people. Europe's long secular and religious heritage needs to be pulled apart and re-imagined.
This paper suggested that ethical secularism should be at the center of a European secular manifesto. Ethical secularism's central message is that diversity is superior over homogeneity. In order to thrive diversity of all kinds requires a stable unitary framework, the marketplace of religions. Ethical secularism is an affirmation of the secular age, rather than a negation of religion. Ethical secularism attempts to free itself from in-built biases against religious minorities to become a fully independent worldview of worldviews. The illustration used in this paper is the negative attitude towards European Muslims and towards Islam more generally. It is hard to deny that the European Court of Human Rights, for example, treats Islamic symbols and practices in a discriminatory fashion even if it starts with the recognition of freedom of religion for all.
European courts will be successful if they address inbuilt biases that make religious minorities aliens in a society, while entrenching the beliefs and symbols of religious Secularism is being questioned in Europe, but the question is not whether or not we want secularism; rather it is about which conception of secularism we want. The question we have to ask is: what do we want Europe to be like? Do we want it to be a racist place that discriminates those people that do not fit the rather narrow profile shaped by the European Christian past? Or do we want it to be an open place that is confident about its secularism and its achievements and for that reason it can afford a great amount of genuine diversity without falling apart? I opt for the second.
